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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [KCRM](#) [PTER](#) [KNNP](#) [RO](#)  
SUBJECT: BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE REAL TIME  
OPERATION

Classified By: DCM MARK TAPLIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) (C) (D) AND (F)

¶1. (C) Summary: On January 30-31, Romania hosted the Black Sea Border Security Initiative (BSBSI) "real-time operation." As the final event of the STYX 20058 scenario, the Romanians demonstrated a mock seizure of a truck carrying a radiological commodity to representatives of Bulgaria, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, with TDY PolOff serving as U.S. observer. All participant states agreed to cooperatively building coordination networks between their respective operational nonproliferation infrastructures. Of the five BSBSI participants, Romania, Moldova, and Georgia showed the greatest enthusiasm. Bulgaria agreed in principle with the goals of the initiative, but is concerned time spent on BSBSI is time lost elsewhere. This conference was clearly useful as a forum for increasing cooperation, but it was also in many respects a Romanian show. For BSBSI to have further value, it needs to demonstrate an increase in cooperation between nonproliferation institutions. Absent U.S. (or external) pressure to the contrary, Romania will continue to use BSBSI as a mechanism for this nonproliferation institutional development. The Romanians are adamant that such cooperation will not develop without the political impetus provided by BSBSI or some similar initiative. Bulgaria's reaction to Romania's bilateral overtures will be useful to gauge whether BSBSI will prove an effective mechanism for increasing regional cooperation. End Summary.

#### OPENING REMARKS

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¶2. (SBU) Romanian MFA Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Combating Terrorism Office Chief Dan Neculaescu opened the Third BSBSI Reunion conference by noting the threat posed by the Black Sea region as a route for illicit trafficking of WMD materials. He emphasized BSBSI's role as an ad hoc forum for enhanced cooperation of Black Sea countries. Ukrainian Intelligence Service officer Olexander Krasenkov noted that, for the first time, Ukraine had sent a delegation to a BSBSI activity from their capital. Bulgarian MFA official Parisa Popnikolova noted that the fight against WMD was a central component of Bulgaria's national strategy. She noted the importance of information sharing, developing joint border activities, and export control. She also noted that it was not clear how the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and BSBSI relate, but she noted the potential for the two initiatives to be complementary. Georgian Customs officer David Akhmedliany noted the

importance of regional cooperation in building trust and security. Moldovan Special and Intelligence Service officer Vadim Vrabie noted that the fight against WMD was of critical importance to Moldova, and further hoped that the countries of the region could generally strengthen cooperation on cross-border issues.

#### THE REAL-TIME OPERATION

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13. (SBU) Following the opening session at the MFA, the GOR demonstrated its procedure for interdicting radiological material in transit at a mock border crossing. They constructed the border crossing at a police training facility on the outskirts of Bucharest. A van, operated by the faux terrorist organization EMANON, and carrying a quantity of Cobalt-60, passed through the mock border crossing. For purposes of the exercise, the Romanians stipulated that they had information given them by other BSBSI states regarding the illicit nature of the van's cargo. Upon identification of the van by Border Police and Customs personnel, a SWAT team under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Intelligence Service (the so-called Antiterrorist Brigade) prepared an ambush. Knowing that the van was going to be ambushed, the border police allowed the van to cross into Romanian territory, after which the Intelligence Service SWAT team blocked the van's route with their own vehicle while a team descended on the van, arresting the driver at gunpoint. Meanwhile, the Gendarmerie cordoned off the wider perimeter (a cordon that was maintained throughout the entire operation.)

14. (SBU) After the arrest of the driver, there commenced a review of the van for pyrotechnics or incendiaries. The Interior Ministry NBC service investigated the van for traces

of WMD material. Upon their detection of radioactivity from one of the van's containers, Interior Ministry NBC service troops contacted the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). CNCAN placed the Cobalt-60 in custody, and was decontaminated by Interior Ministry NBC troops. CNCAN official Viviana Grama advised the international delegations that CNCAN would retain custody of the material pending the conclusion of the terrorist's trial, in order to ensure that the Romanian Prosecutor's office can demonstrate a documented chain of custody. They would also advise the IAEA illicit trafficking database of the seizure. Following the conclusion of the trial, the material would be disposed of in one of Romania's two disposition sites with sufficient physical protection. (In another presentation Grama identified that one site was for nuclear material, and the other for radiological sources.)

#### WRAP-UP SESSION

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15. (SBU) During the concluding session, the delegations broadly agreed to the terms of reference document circulated by the Romanians prior to the real-time operation. The Romanians advised the other BSBSI delegations that the terms of reference would be used to clarify to other countries on BSBSI's methodologies, goals, and objectives. They proposed to use the terms of reference to formally brief Russia, Turkey, and other potential Balkan states on BSBSI's accomplishments to date. The Romanians then submitted a questionnaire, asking the BSBSI states their own procedures for responding to incidents similar to the mock radiological seizure that the Romanians demonstrated during the real-time operation. They also requested the other BSBSI states to develop national points-of-contact to continue development of BSBSI projects following conclusion of the STYX 20058 exercise. All delegations agreed, but the Bulgarians noted that they had already established points-of-contact to meet their PSI obligations. Therefore, they proposed to use the same networks for any BSBSI activities. The Ukrainian delegation stated that they would shortly develop an interagency nonproliferation working group as a means of meeting their own PSI responsibilities, whom they would use for BSBSI activities as well. They were also careful to note that they were not formally committed to

BSBSI.

BULGARIA,S CONCERNS REGARDING BSBSI,S UTILITY

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16. (C) In a candid setting, TDY PolOff discussed BSBSI with Bulgarian MFA nonproliferation official Paris Popnikolova and Romanian MFA official Dana Marca on Bulgarian participation in BSBSI. Popnikolova responded that Bulgaria was in agreement with BSBSI,s objectives, and agreed in principle regarding the need to enhance regional nonproliferation cooperation. Popnikolova questioned, however, the particular value-added that BSBSI could bring, stating that she was concerned that it was duplicative with other initiatives and fora, and PSI in particular. She also noted that she felt somewhat overwhelmed by the multiplicity of international nonproliferation programs and initiatives, citing BSEC and the Stability Pact as also having nonproliferation components. Popnikolova opined that much of the coordination between national institutions that BSBSI sought to create already existed de facto. Marca responded that BSBSI,s advantage was that it focused on a regional setting. The connections between nonproliferation institutions fostered by BSBSI should be occurring on an ad hoc basis around the globe, but it was BSBSI that was actually doing it in the Black Sea region.

17. (U) PARTICIPANTS

Bulgaria

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Mr. Kiril Mishev, MFA  
Mr. Emil Bonev, Nuclear Agency  
Mr. Dragomir Markov, Border Agency  
Ms. Parisa Popnikolova, MFA  
Mr. Volodya Velkov, Ministry of the Interior

Mr. Dimo Tzonev, Ministry of the Interior

Georgia

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Mr. Vakhtang Gelashvili, Directorate for Customs Control  
Mr. Mindia Janelidze, Special Service of Foreign Intelligence  
Mr. David Akhdlediani, Directorate for Customs Control

Moldova

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Mr. Vadim Vrabie, Special and Intelligence Service  
Mr. Sergiu Cracium, Border Directorate  
Mr. Vadim Dumitrascu, National Customs Directorate

Romania

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Mr. Dan Neculaescu, Director, Office for Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Combating Terrorism, MFA  
Ms. Dana Marca, MFA  
Mr. Victor Mircescu, MFA  
Mr. Dorin Grosu, Romanian Police, NBC Service, Ministry of Administration and Interior  
Mr. Alin Tanase, Romanian Police, NBC Service, Ministry of Administration and Interior  
Mr. Ivan Lucian, Ministry of Administration and Interior  
Mr. Cristian Ionascu, Border Police, Ministry of Administration and Interior  
Mr. Razvan Budeanu, Border Police, Ministry of Administration and Interior  
Mr. Mircea Olaru, General Inspectorate of the Romanian Gendarmerie  
Mr. Vilmos Zsombori, President, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control  
Ms. Viviana Grama, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control  
Mr. Nicolae Dumitrescu, National Commission for Nuclear

Activities Control

Ms. Adriana Baciuc, National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control

Ms. Anca Marinescu, National Customs Authority

Mr. Dragos Mihai, National Customs Authority

Mr. Iulian Spanu, National Customs Authority

Ms. Mihaela Polezache, Romanian Intelligence Service

Mr. Laurentiu Tomiuc, Romanian Intelligence Service

Mr. Horatiu Grigorescu, Romanian Intelligence Service

Mr. Alexandru Florea, Romanian Intelligence Service

Ms. Alina Ion, Romanian Intelligence Service

Mr. Nicolae Neferoiu, Foreign Intelligence Service

Mr. Augustin Aculai, Nuclear Agency

Mr. Dragos Toca, National Agency for Export Control

Mr. Ioan Onofrievici, Ministry of Defense

Ukraine

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Ms. Iana Ivanovna Ignatenko, National Border Authority

Mr. Olexandr Ninelovici Krasenkov, Intelligence Service

Mr. Ivan Zaitsev, Interior Attache, Embassy of Ukraine to Romania

U.S. (observer)

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Mr. John Conlon, EUR/PRA, U.S. Department of State

18. (U) U) AmEmbassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:

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